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QUEERLY* UNCONSTITUIONAL?:
SouTH CAROLINA BANS SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
The State came firstfor the homosexuals, but I didn't speak
up because I wasn't a homosexual ....
I. INTRODUCTION

Homosexuals are at it again. Gays and lesbians throughout this nation are
once more demanding special rights., This time, the special right they demand
is the very same right heterosexuals have enjoyed for millennia: the right to
marry. 2 South Carolina has recently set itself squarely against such unions,3

* Throughout this note, use of the term "queer" is avoided as the author does not wish to
cause offense. Instead, the author uses the terms "gay" and "homosexual." The term's
appearance in the title is purely a play on words and more ajibe at legislators than anyone else.
** This statement is based on the following quotation known as "I didn't speak up."
In Germany, the Nazi's came first for the Communists, and I didn't speak up
because I wasn't a Communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn'r speak up
because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak
up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics, and I didn't
speak up because I was a Protestant. Then they came for me, and by that time there
was no one left to speak up.
JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 684 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed., 1992) (attributed to
Martin Niemoeller).
1. In a letter to the editor of the Wall Street Journal, one gay male admitted that homosexuals
do have special rights.
I do have special rights because I am gay. I have the right to be fired from my
job and be denied housing in 41 states without legal recourse .... I have the right
to be denied custody of my son in most legal jurisdictions .... I have the right to

be denied visitation of my lover in a hospital's intensive care unit because we are not
legally considered to be a family. I have the right to incur large legal bills and suffer
great uncertainty in an estate settlement if he dies before I do, despite any wills
that we might prepare ....
I don't want these special rights or any others.
John R. Selig, Letter to editor, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1995, at A13.
2. Same-sex couples now enjoy the rights of civil marriage in Denmark, Sweden and
Norway. See Lawrence Ingrassia, Danes Don't Debate Same-Sex Marriages, They Celebrate
Them, Wall St. J., June 8, 1994, at Al.
3. The most explicit prohibition is found in S.C. CODE ANN. §20-1-15 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1996): "A marriage between persons of the same sex is void ab initio and against the public
policy of this State." But the prohibitory theme is reiterated elsewhere:
(A) All persons, except mentally incompetent persons and persons whose
marriage is prohibited by this section, may lawfully contract matrimony.
(B) No man shall marry his mother, grandmother, daughter, granddaughter,
stepmother, sister, grandfather's wife, son's wife, grandson's wife, wife's mother,
wife's grandmother, wife's daughter, wife's granddaughter, brother's daughter,
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and by doing so, joined the increasing number of jurisdictions that ban samesex marriages within their borders.4 The legal groundwork is complete, and
the legal battle concerning marital recognition is nearing inevitability.5

sister's daughter, father's sister, mother's sister, or anotherman.
(C) No woman shall marry her father, grandfather, son, grandson, stepfather,
brother, grandmother's husband, daughter's husband, granddaughter's husband,
husband's father, husband's grandfather, husband's son, husband's grandson,
brother's son, sister's son, father's brother, mother's brother, or anotherwoman."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
4. For additional examples of state statutes banning same-sex marriages, see ALASKA STAT
§25.05.013 (Michie Supp. 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(C) (West Supp. 1996); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (Supp. 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (Michie Supp. 1997);
IDAHO CODE §32-209 (Supp. 1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212(a)(5), 5/213.1 (West

Supp. 1996);

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 36-3-113 (Supp. 1996).

5. As for the inevitability of confrontation see infra section II, THE HAWAHAN EXPERiENcE.
South Carolina's same-sex marriage prohibition may sound eerily familiar to the many
African-Americans who can still hear the ringing of racism expressed in the now defunct antimiscegenation statutes. Surely there is a similarity between the historical racism of those statutes
and the homophobia inherent in the present legislation.
Until the United States Supreme Court decided Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
South Carolina law prohibited the inter-marriage of blacks and whites. This anti-miscegenation
law appeared in both the state constitution and in the state code. See S.C. CONST. art. III,
§ 33
("The marriage of a white person with a negro or mulatto, or person who shall have one-eighth
or more of negro blood, shall be unlawful and void"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7 (Law. Co-op.
1962) (stating same but also prohibiting inter-marriage between whites and Indians with an
exception for marriages between the Catawba Indians and whites).
The same arguments made in favor of prohibiting inter-racial marriages only one generation
ago are today being used to prohibit same-sex marriages. First, opponents of same-sex marriage
invoke Christian values as their forerunners, the anti-miscegenation apologists, did. For example,
God did not intend men to marry men and women to marry women. See Genesis 2:22-24 (New
Int'l Version):
Then the Lord God made a woman from the rib [I]e had taken out of the man, and [He
brought her to the man.
The man said, "This is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be
called 'woman,' for she was taken out of man."
For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and
they will become one flesh.
See also Leviticus 18:22 (New Int'l Version) (commanding the Israelites "not [to] lie with man,
as one lies with a woman: that is detestable"). Similarly, on the much lesser authority of a
Virginia state trial court judge who, when banishing an interracial couple from the Commonwealth, stated: "Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay, and red, and [HI]e
placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with this arrangement there
would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that [H]e separated the races shows that [le did
not intend for the races to mix." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967). However, as the
Hawaii Supreme Court recently noted, "With all due respect to the Virginia courts of a bygone
era, we do not believe that trial judges are the ultimate authorities on the subject ofDivine Will."
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993).
Second, opponents of same-sex marriages argue that current law does not discriminate
against men or women. The Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr rejected this argument, just as the
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This note will focus primarily on the prohibitions of South Carolina's
statutory law. The local enactments are designed to accomplish two purposes.
First, they definitively prohibit recognition of same-sex marriages contracted
in this State. Second, they indirectly deny recognition of same-sex marriages
validly contracted outside this State. The constitutionality of each statutory
component or effect will be analyzed separately.
In addition, certain parallel enactments and decisional law outside this
State will be presented because they contain lessons essential to any proper
discourse on this subject. Recent litigation in Hawaii is the clear point from
which to embark.
II. THE HAWAIIAN EXPERIENCE
In 1991, the State of Hawaii declined to issue marriage licenses to three
same-sex couples. Two years later, the Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled that the
state's refusal to issue these licenses might have violated the equal protection
guarantee of the State's constitution. 6 In particular, the Hawaii constitution
contains an equal rights amendment which increases the presumptively
heterosexual-only marriage law's susceptibility to constitutional challenge.'
The Hawaii court accepted the analogy to Loving v. Virginia' and concluded
that if a person's right to marry is denied because of the gender of

United States Supreme Court in Loving had rejected a similar argument by anti-miscegenation
apologists who claimed that the laws forbidding interracial marriage did not discriminate against
blacks or whites.
The parallelism of these arguments has been simply stated by one commentator: just as
African-Americans would pollute the sanctity of white womanhood, gays would destroy the
sanctity of marriage. See James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriageand the
Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93, 110 (1993).
6. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The case was originally a plurality opinion.
However, in a rehearing after Justice Nakayamajoined the court, threejustices formed a majority
and held that the Hawaii marriage law discriminated on the basis of sex and was subject to strict
scrutiny analysis. As a result, Justice Bums' "biological fate" concurrence will not control on
remand. Evan Wolfson, co-counsel for Plaintiffs in Baehr, and Senior Staff Attorney of Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., heralded the Baehr decision as "nothing less than a
tectonic shift, a fundamental realignment of the landscape." Evan Wolfson, Crossing the
Threshold:Equal MarriageRightsforLesbiansand Gay Men andthe Intra-Community Critique,
21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567, 572 (1994-95).
7. HAW. CoNsT. art. I, § 5 provides in part that "[n]o person shall.., be denied the equal
protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry."
8. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Loving Court rejected the argument that an anti-miscegenation
statute did not discriminate against blacks because both participants in an interracial marriage
were punished equally. "[W]e reject the notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute
containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth
Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial discrimination . . . ." Id. at 8.
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that person's partner, then that person has been discriminated against on the
basis of gender even though both males and females are treated equally under
the marriage statute.9 The analogy to Loving was clear because a simple
"[s]ubstitution of 'sex' for 'race' and article I, section 5 for the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment yield[ed] the precise case" before the court.' 0
In federal equal protection analysis, gender discrimination categorically
receives intermediate scrutiny1 whereas race discrimination is subject to
strict scrutiny.' 2 According to the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v.
Lewin,13 however, the more expansive (as in rights-based) Hawaii constitution alters this analysis. In Baehr, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that under
article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution, sex, like race, is "a 'suspect
category' for purposes of equal protection analysis."" The court, therefore,
demanded that the State show the marriage statute's sex-based classification to
be "justified by compelling state interests" and the statute itself to be
"narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of the applicant couples'
constitutional rights."' 5 The court remanded the case for the trial court to
determine whether the state had such a compelling reason to continue in its
discrimination. 16
Hawaii's State Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law, the
members of which were appointed by the Governor, found no legitimate
reason for refusing marriages to same-sex couples. Nevertheless, in reaction
to the Baehr decision, the Hawaii legislature passed an act reaffirming the
State's desire to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.' 7 The
legislature asserted that the state had a "compelling interest" in restricting
marriages to different-sex couples because marriage was intended for the
propagation of the human race by man-woman units.'" On remand, the state

9. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that a gender classification must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve those
objectives). See also United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (holding that there must
be an exceedingly persuasive justification for a gender classification).
12. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that racial
classifications be subject to the "most rigid scrutiny").
13. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
14. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 68.
17. HAv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (Michie Supp. 1997).
18. Without quoting statistics, one can safely assume that the human race is not on the brink
of extinction in either Hawaii or South Carolina.
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failed to persuade the trial court that this interest was sufficiently compelling. 9 The case is once again on appeal, and most commentators agree
that "there is a strong possibility that the Hawaii courts will ultimately require
the state to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples."'
III. SAME-SEX MARRIAGES NOT VALID IF CONTRACTED IN SOUTH CAROLINA
South Carolina may permissibly regulate the right of access to the marital
relationship subject to constitutional limitations or restraints. 2 In accord with
this basic authority, the General Assembly prohibited recognition of same-sex
marriages contracted within the borders of this State. A homosexual couple
challenging South Carolina's ban on same-sex marriage may challenge the
statute on due process and equal protection grounds.'
A. Substantive Due Process
There is a fundamental right to marry.3

Indeed, the United States

19. Before the retrial, the Baehr case had again been before the Supreme Court of Hawaii.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints had attempted to intervene in the litigation. The
court denied intervention on the grounds that churches would not be required to solemnize samesex marriages. See Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996). Lawrence H. Miike was
appointed Director of Health by the Governor of Hawaii in 1994 and has been substituted
automatically for his predecessor, Lewin, as a defendant in the action.
20. H.R. RP. No. 104-664, at 5 (1996) available in 1996 WL 391835. Honeymooners in
Hawaii currently sport "his-and-her" T-shirts proclaiming the transformation of their legal status
with the words "Just MAUI-ed." Perhaps, before too long, a new line of "her-and-her" and "hisand-his" T-shirts will be rolling off the presses. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Hawaii on Threshold to
OK Gay Marriages,THE WASH. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at A3.
21. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
22. Evan Wolfson stated that"... Lambda's marriage strategy is to do everything possible
to secure a final victory in Hawaii while temporarily holding back on marriage litigation in states
or particular cases in which the prospects for defeat seem great." Evan Wolfson, CrossingThe
Threshold: EqualMarriageRightsforLesbiansand Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique,
21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567, 611 (1994-95). Lambda (a national organization
supporting homosexual rights) sets forth a number of factors to determine if litigation should be
pursued in a particular state. These factors include whether the state (1) has a sodomy law; (2)
has an equal rights or privacy provision in its constitution; (3) has good case law or legislation
regarding personal autonomy, sexual orientation, marital status, and gender discrimination; (4)
has a political climate that is not anti-gay and (5) has a state judiciary inclined toward Lambda's
goals. Id. at 611 n.194. The prospects for litigation and victory in South Carolina seem dim.
23. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). The Supreme Court deciared that "the right
to marry is part of the fundamental "right of privacy" implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause."Id. at 384. Also, in the watershed decision of Griswoldv. Connecticut,381
U.S. 479 (1965), the Court noted that "[m]arriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred." Id. at 486. Last century, in
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Supreme Court has stated that marriage is "essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men."' Apparently, however, two free men may not
pursue this happiness together. This is largely because marriage has been
considered a "fundamental" right due to its link to procreation.' Although
gay and lesbian couples can and do have children from prior heterosexual
marriages and through adoption, surrogacy, or artificial insemination,' 6 no
court has ever held, as a result, that homosexuals enjoy the same right to
marry as heterosexuals.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected a substantive due process
challenge because it viewed the right to same-sex marriage as not "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist
if it were sacrificed."- Had the Loving Court so narrowly framed the issue
as a substantive due process challenge (asking whether there exists a
fundamental right to interracial marriage), there likely would not have been a
landmark decision. Even interracial marriages do not rise to the level of being
8
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or a part of this nation's history.A court intending to honor a substantive due process challenge to South
Carolina's statute, therefore, would have to create a new fundamental right to
homosexual marriage. It can be said with some certainty that .same-sex

Maynardv. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), the Supreme Court characterized marriage as "the most
important relation in life," Id. at 205, and as "the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress." Id. at 211.
24. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
25. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386 (noting that if the "right to procreate means anything
at all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which the State ... allows sexual
relations legally to take place"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is one
of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival.").
26. "A 1988 study by the American Bar Association found that eight to ten million children
are currently being raised in three million gay and lesbian households." Richard D. Mohr, The
Casefor Gay Marriage,9 NOTRE DAM J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 215, 224 (1995) (citing
Editors of the Harvard Law Review, Sexual Orientation and the Law 119 (1990)).
27. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993). It is, ofcourse, noteworthy that the court
decided to frame the issue so narrowly. In this respect, the court's analysis mirrored that of
Justice White in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). A broader framing of the issue-such
as an individual's right to marry the person whom he or she chooses to marry - may have led
to a very different result on the substantive due process issue.
28. In this country, laws prohibiting interracial marriages have been in existence from as
early as Colonial times. See Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia'sAnti-Miscegenation
Statute in HistoricalPerspective, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1189, 1191 (1966).
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marriage is not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 29 The
substantive due process attack appears to be a dead end.
B. Equal Protection
Essentially, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth- Amendment to
the United States Constitution requires that states must not discriminate,
without sufficient justification, against members of a constitutionally protected
class.3" The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of
whether homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class.3" Such a
determination, in fact, appears to be moot because of the ruling in the recent
case of Romer v Evans.32

29. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 333 (D.C. App. 1995) (quoting Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)). Although not deeply
rooted in this nation's history, same-sex marriages have deep roots in other cultures. The Native
American berdache, for example, was a male who dressed in female clothes. Such men were
revered in Zuni circles for their supposed connection to the supernatural. The most gifted
berdacheswere known as !hamana, or spiritual leader. The most celebrated Zuni Ihamana of the
nineteenth century was We'Wha who married a man and served as an emissary for the Zuni
nation to Washington, D.C. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage,79
VA. L. REv. 1419, 1419 (1993). In ancient times, same-sex marriages were often common. For
example, "The consensus among modem historians is that republican Rome, like classical
Greece, was tolerant of same-sex relationships." Id. at 1445. Medieval historian John Boswell
noted that "by the time of the early [Roman] Empire[,] references to gay marriages [were]
commonplace." Id. at 1446 (quoting John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and
Homosexuality 81-82 (1980)). Indeed, the Roman Emperor, Nero, married two men in succession
"both in public ceremonies with the ritual appropriate to legal marriage." Id. at 1446. Similar
acceptance of gay marriages can be seen in the history of African and Asian cultures prior to
their domination by western Europe. Id. at 1453-69. As William N. Eskridge noted, "Just as
Western-nation-states in the early modem period conquered the New World and killed most of
its people, colonized and enslaved Africa, and cartelized and evangelized Asian cultures, so they
exported their anti-homosexual attitudes and aggressively suppressed these cultures' indigenous
attitudes and institutions." Id. at 1473. However, post-Christianized Europe had for centuries
earlier tolerated and accepted such same-sex unions. For example, same-sex marriages "were
performed in Rome in the Church of St. John during the 1570s." Id. at 1472. Furthermore,
according to Boswell, Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox priests continued to perform same-sex
marriage ceremonies into the nineteenth century. Id. at 1474 n.194. Without the sanction of the
church or the state, same-sex unions between women were common among well-educated,
professional women in nineteenth century Boston. Id. at 1476. These unions were known as
"Boston marriages" because the relationships were so similar to the lives of a female couple in
Henry James' novel, The Bostonians. Id.
30. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
31. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that a state's right to
prohibit consensual homosexual sodomy did not violate the Due Process Clause) with Romer v.
Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996) (holding that a state may not discriminate against a group of its
citizens based purely on animus toward that group).
32. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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In Romer, the citizens of Colorado amended their state's constitution to
prohibit the State's government, or any of its political subdivisions, from
enacting policies to protect homosexuals from discrimination.3 3 Although the
plaintiffs challenged the amendment on equal protection grounds, the Court did
not engage- in traditional suspect class analysis. Instead, the Court applied a
rigorous rational review to invalidate the amendment.3 It is thus unlikely
that the Supreme Court would change its tack and engage in the traditional
suspect class analysis if faced with a similar question, such as an equal
3
protection challenge to South Carolina's statute prohibiting same-sex marriage.

33. Id. at 1623.
34. Id. at 1627-29.
35. However, if the Court were to employ the traditional analysis, it is not clear whether
homosexuals would enjoy the greater level of scrutiny available to suspect and quasi-suspect
classes. The constitutional analysis that legislative treatment of particular classes of individuals
requires greater judicial scrutiny can be traced to dictum in United States v. CaroleneProducts
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Justice Stone, in his famous footnote four, explained
that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition... curtail[ing]
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
[so] may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Since then, the judicial
inquiry into suspectness has developed to include a number of indicia.
First, a suspect class must have suffered a history of purposeful discrimination. See San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Homosexuals have historically
suffered discrimination. Justice Brennan once noted in a dissent from a denial of certiorari
that "homosexuals have historically been the object of pernicious and sustained hostility."
Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985). For a catalog of the forms
of discrimination that homosexuals have suffered, see Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and
the Constitution:Homosexual Personsas a Discreteand InsularMinority, 10 WOMEN'S RTs. L.
REP. 143, 157 (1988).
Second, a suspect class is subject to such deep-rooted prejudice that its members suffer
disabilities based upon inaccurate stereotypes not reflecting the individual's ability to contribute
to society. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
It is difficult to conceive of a class of persons who have suffered more from stereotyping than
have homosexuals. Homosexuals are stereotyped as sexually promiscuous, as pedophiles and as
persons who do not want to "settle down" into long-term, committed relationships. The demand
for equal rights to marriage alone would seem to shatter all of these stereotypes in one blow.
Third, a suspect class is defined by the presence of an immutable trait. See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The issue of immutability is perhaps the most controversial.
As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently noted, "There is no scientific consensus
about the origin of sexual orientation." Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 346 (D.C.
App. 1995). This is, indeed, the crux of the matter for the question of suspectness may well turn
on whether homosexuality is a sexual orientation resulting from genetic and hormonal differences
between heterosexuals and homosexuals or whether homosexuality is entirely a learned, and thus
psychological, phenomenon. Those who believe homosexuality is learned behavior or a product
of choice look to evidence of homosexuals who have been "cured." The notion of curing
homosexuality is not new. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 348 n.53 (D.C.
App. 1995) (citing B.H. Fookes, Some Experiences in the Use of Aversion Therapy in Male
Homosexuality, Exhibitionism, and Fetish-Transvestism, 115 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 339 (1969)
(finding that six out of nine males who had not experienced heterosexual intercourse prior to
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/9
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Under the Romer analysis, states such as South Carolina would bear the
burden of proving that proffered state interests are legitimate and that a statute
prohibiting recognition of same-sex unions is rationally related to these
legitimate state interests.36 If a state should fail to carry this burden, a samesex marriage prohibition "raise[s] the inevitable inference" 37 that the law is
"inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class [of persons] that it
affects. "38 Since neither Colorado nor South Carolina may pass legislation for

shock aversion therapy demonstrated a decreased homosexual arousal and engaged in heterosexual
sex after three years)). But as Justice Ferren in a concurrence in Dean noted, "[E]nforcing a
public policy for 'curing' homosexuals [is] an Orwellian road not to be traveled." Dean, 653
A.2d at 352.
Finally, a suspect class is typically a politically powerless minority. See Rodriquez, 411
U.S. at 28. Homosexuals are not perceived as being politically powerless. Justice Scalia, for
example, does not consider homosexuals to be politically powerless. In one vigorous dissent, the
Justice employed a little stereotyping of his own when he generalized that:
[B]ecause those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities .... have high disposable income, . .. and
of course care about homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public
at large, they possess political power much greater than their numbers, both locally
[Ihey devote this political power to achieving not merely a
and statewide ....
grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of homosexuality.
Romerv. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1634 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Congress seems to agree
with Justice Scalia because a recent House Report described the struggle for equal rights in
marriage as an "orchestrated legal assault being waged against traditional heterosexual marriage
by gay rights groups and their lawyers." H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996) available in 1996
WL 391835. Measuring the politicalpowerlessness of homosexuals is complicated because, unlike
African-Americans or women, many in the class are "closeted." As a result, the political power
of homosexuals is more diffuse than other groups seeking legislative change. However, as one
court recently noted, "There can be no question that the political power of gays and lesbians has
grown." Dean, 653 A.2d. at 350. It is unlikely, however, that their power has reached the "gay
under every bed" stage Justice Scalia believes has arrived.
Therefore, it remains a matter of pure speculation whether the Supreme Court will
ultimately classify homosexuals as a suspect or quasi-suspect class for purposes of an equal
protection challenge to a state's statutory refusal to recognize same-sex marriages. This
eventuality seems unlikely for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court seems to have sets its face
against recognizing more suspectand quasi-suspectclasses. See Romerv. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996) (choosing not to consider the question ofwhether homosexuals constitute a suspect class);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985) ("[If the] mentally
retarded were deemed quasi-suspect .... it would be difficult to find a principled way to
distinguish a variety of other groups.., who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least
part of the public at large .... [Therefore, the Court is] reluctant to set out on that course.").
Second, without clear scientific proof that sexual orientation is the result ofgenetics, homosexuals
would have great difficulty in proving a sufficient level of suspectuess to warrant greater
protection from the Court.
36. See generallyRomer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (appearing to place the burden ofproof on the state
instead of on the plaintiff who traditionally bears this burden under rational review).
37. 116 S.Ct. at 1628.
38. Id. at 1627.
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the sole purpose of making homosexuals "unequal to everyone else,"" it is
an essential step to examine any interests the state may proffer to explain this
legislation.
1. Procreation
Society cares about heterosexual unions because they are critical for the
raising of children. By contrast, "[w]hether homosexual relationships endure
is of little concern to society. " ' Marriage, however, is quite simply not
founded on procreation.4 1 Society permits heterosexual couples to marry
regardless of whether the couple intends to procreate. Not everyone who gets
married has children, and not everyone who has children is married. As Evan
Wolfson once noted, "Marriage licenses, after all, are not issued with a
'sunset provision' whereby you have two years to produce a child or your
marriage expires." 42 A United States House Committee on the Judiciary
responded to these arguments, asserting that the absence of such provisions is
the result of practicality more than denial of the base reasons for the institution
of marriage. The Committee retorted, "Surely no one would propose requiring
couples intending to marry to submit to a medical examination to determine
whether they can reproduce, or to sign a pledge indicating that they intend to
do so. Such steps would be both offensive and unworkable." 43
The logic that marriage is principally for procreation raises the question,
why is there no government supervision attempting to ensure propagation of
the species? The rationale preventing such involvement is that, as the
Committee said, forcing married couples to procreate is "offensive" and
"unworkable." Perhaps the Committee saw a distinction, not readily apparent
to this author, between the offensiveness of the hypothetical government
involvement and the offensiveness of denying two persons in love the right to
marry simply because they are of the same sex.
2. Tradition and the TraditionalFamily
Courts have rejected equal protection challenges to marriage statutes by
asserting that the institution of marriage has traditionally been def'ned to

39. Id. at 1629.
40. Lisa Schiffren, Op. Ed., Gay Marriage,an Oxymoron, N.Y.TuMEs, Mar. 23, 1996, at A.
41. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the right to privacy
prohibits the government from interfering with a married couple's decision not to procreate).
42. EvanWolfson, CrossingtheThreshold:EqualMarriageRightsforLesbians
and Gay Men
and the Intra-Conmunity Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567, 576 n.42 (1994-

95).
43. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 14 (1996) available in 1996 WL 391835.
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include only one man and one woman.' The "reasoning" continues
that same-sex couples may not marry because they are unable to enter into an
institution which by its very definition excludes them. This reasoning evades
the central equal protection issue; moreover, the tautological and circular
nature of the argument should embarrass those courts which employed it.4'
Tradition is neither a justification for discrimination nor an impenetrable
legal barrier. In the same spirit as the heterosexual tradition currently relied
upon, marriage was once defined as an institution in which a man owned his
wife as property. Blackstone described this eighteenth-century marital bliss:
"The very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband:
under whose wing, protection and cover she performs everything ... ."46
This tradition has been abandoned. Just as the Supreme Court in Loving
demonstrated the error in a tradition which defined marriage as an institution
between parties of the same race only, a court could abandon the tradition of
recognizing only heterosexual marriages. 47 Thus, if tradition remains the
state's only claimed purpose, perhaps the act is the result of animus toward
homosexuals.

44. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995) (holding that the
District of Columbia's marriage statute refers only to the legal union of one man and one
woman); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 558,589 (Ky. 1973) (noting that "marriage has always
been considered as the union of a man and a woman"); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186
(Minn. 1971) (noting that "[t]he institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely
involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of
Genesis"); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (holding
that a "[m]arriage is and always has been a contract between a man and a woman"); De Santo
v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that common-law same-sex marriages
did not exist in Pennsylvania); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)
(noting that marriage is "the legal union of one man and one woman"); see also 55 C.J.S.
Marriage § 1 (1948) (defining marriage as "a contract under which a man and a woman
reciprocally engage to live with each other during their joint lives, and to discharge toward each
other the duties imposed by law on the relation of husband and wife"); 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage
§ 1 (1970) (defining marriage as "the status or relation of a man and a woman who have been
legally united as husband and wife"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 972 (6th ed., 1990) (defining
marriage as the "[llegal union of one man and one woman as husband and wife"); RANDOM
HousE DICTIONARY 879 (10th ed., 1994) (defining marriage as "the social institution under
which a man and a woman establish their decision to live as husband and wife by legal
commitments, religious ceremonies, etc.").
45. The Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected this argument characterizing it as an exercise in
"tortured and conclusory sophistry." Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993). Indeed, the
court noted that the same argument had already been rejected by the United States Supreme Court
in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Id.
46. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
47. As Justice Holmes quipped a hundred years ago, "It is revolting to have no better reason
for a rule than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV." Oliver W. Holmes, The Path
of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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Defenders of the status quo may vehemently argue, as the contributors to
the House Committee Report on the Defense of Marriage Act opined, that "[i]t
would be incomprehensible for any court to conclude that traditional marriage
laws are ... motivated by animus toward homosexuals." 48 This is undoubtedly true because most marriage statutes were enacted at a time when same-sex
unions were unthinkable to all "right-minded" Americans. Homosexuals may
still argue, however, that the recently enacted statutes, not the traditional laws
defining marriage, are the product of animus toward them as a group. In
Romer, the second amendment to Colorado's constitution "identifie[d] persons
by a single trait and then denie[d] them protection across the board." 4 9
Similarly, the General Assembly has identified homosexuals by a single trait
(whether it is their sexual orientation or their sexual conduct) and denied to
them the privileges and obligations inexorably linked to the institution of civil
marriage.5" South Carolina's own precedent would seem to indicate that such
an act is not favored in this state.
A decade ago, the South Carolina Court of Appeals noted that strict
scrutiny is appropriate in the marriage context "where the obstacle to marriage
is a direct one, i.e., one that operates to preclude marriage entirely for a
certain class of people."s The recent prohibition on same-sex marriages
squarely conflicts with this decisional rule. The statute expressly forbids males
from marrying other males and females from marrying other females.
Homosexuals-as a class-are denied a right granted to others based only on
their sexual orientation.
3. Religion and EnforcedMorality
Conceivably, the General Assembly enacted the statute prohibiting
recognition of same-sex marriages based upon its perception of majority
religious values. Enactment on such grounds would appear to find favor with
the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. In 1986, the Court decided
the landmark case of Bowers v. Hardwick,5 2 which lends credence to the
state's argument that enforcement of religious morality is a legitimate interest.

48. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 33 (1996), available in 1996 WL 391835.
49. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
50. The United States Supreme Court has identified four "important attributes of marriage."
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987). First, marriages are expressions of emotional support
and public commitment; second, the commitment of marriage may be an exercise in religious
faith as well as a personal dedication; third, marriages are usually solemnized with the ultimate
intent to consummate; finally, marital status is the precondition to a number of benefits. Id. at 9596. For a complete list of the legal incidents of marriage, see Marriage Project: Legal and
Economic Benefits, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
51. Hamilton v. Board of Trustees of Oconee County, 282 S.C. 519, 524, 319 S.E.2d 717,
720 (Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added).
52. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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In Bowers, the Court held that a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy53 was
constitutional. Indeed, Justice White, writing for the majority, expressly held
that the anti-sodomy law served the legitimate purpose of expressing "the
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. " " Furthermore, as Chief Justice
Burger noted in his concurrence, "Condemnation of [homosexual conduct]
is
55
firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian [sic] moral and ethical standards."
If majority religious thinking is a legitimate rationale for state action,
what is left of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause?56 As Justice
Blackmun asserted in his dissent in Bowers, "The legitimacy of secular
legislation depends instead on whether the State can advance some justification
for its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine. " " A rationale for
South Carolina's statute based upon religious doctrine ought, therefore, to be
an illegitimate purpose under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Does
Bowers carve out an exception to the developed law of religious freedom in
this country and tell us that homosexuals have no right to their own set of
moral standards?
4. Potential Violations of the Buggery Statute
The State might plausibly argue that allowing marriage between persons
of the same sex could lead to violations of South Carolina's law against
buggery. 58 The buggery statute has, however, been so rarely enforced that it
belies reason to suggest that it is the legitimate purpose behind South

53. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). Although the statute prohibits both heterosexual and
homosexual sodomy (involving married or unmarried participants), the Court considered only the
application of the statute to homosexuals.
54. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.

55. Id.
56. The First Amendment, made applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause, provides, in pertinent part, that government-federal or state-"shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
57. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
Whoever shall commit the abominable crime of buggery, whether with mankind or
with beast, shall, on conviction, be guilty of [a] felony and shall be imprisoned in the
Penitentiary for five years or shall pay a fine of not less than five hundred dollars,
or both, at the discretion of the court.
The statute does not define what acts constitute the "abominable crime of buggery." However,
BLAcK's LAW DIcnoNARY defines "buggery" as "[a] carnal copulation against nature; a man
or a woman with a brute beast, a man with a man, or man unnaturally with a woman." BLAcK's
LAW DICrIONARY 194 (6th ed. 1990). This term is often used interchangeably with "sodomy."
Id.; see also 1976 WL 30521 (S.C.A.G.) (opining that same-sex marriages would be in direct
conflict with the buggery law so that allowing such marriages would lead to violations of
that statute if the union were ever consummated).
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Carolina's prohibition on same-sex marriages. 59 Indeed, lesbians, whether
granted marital rights or not, do not appear biologically capable of committing
the "abominable crime of buggery."6°
Furthermore, the state's use of the buggery statute as an explanation for
its prohibition on same-sex marriages raises additional equal protection
problems. First, the buggery statute is not limited to homosexual buggery
because heterosexual couples-married and unmarried-are capable of
violating the statute. Second, the State's allowance for heterosexual, common
law marriages, unfairly seems to condone the violation of another morality
statute-the prohibition on fornication. 6 In the end, attempting to find a
legitimate interest in the buggery statute raises more constitutional questions
than it puts to rest.
C. Summary of Due Process and Equal ProtectionAttacks on the In-State,
Same-sex MarriageBan
A substantive due process challenge to South Carolina's statute is dead on
arrival. An equal protection challenge is, on the other hand, somewhat
promising because of the import of Romer v. Evans.62 In Romer, the Court
held that "a bare.., desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest. "63 Thus, a gay couple that could
successfully demonstrate the flaws in each of the proffered interests discussed
above would have a fair chance at striking down South Carolina's ban on
same-sex marriage because, short of some surprising development, the statute
can only be the result of animus toward homosexuals.

59. Of course, one explanation of the statute's lack of enforcement is that the proscribed
activity normally occurs between consenting adults in the privacy of their own home. Although
this would seem to be more of an argument for its repeal than an explanation for its nonenforcement, it does have some merit. However, the abuse of narcotic drugs also often takes
place in the privacy of the home and yet the state expends a great deal of resources to prosecute
those who break its drug laws. A more rational explanation in this author's view, is therefore
that the act of buggery, unlike the illegal use of narcotics, simply does not have a widespread
deleterious effect on society.
60. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY definition of "buggery," supra note 58.
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-80 (Law. Co-op. 1976), fornication is defined as "the living
together and carnal intercourse with each other or habitual carnal intercourse with each other
without living together of a man and woman, both being unmarried." South Carolina's fornication
law appears to be as infrequently enforced as the state's buggery statute.
62. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
63. Id. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/9
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IV. SOUTH CAROLINA'S REFUSAL To RECOGNIZE SAME-SEx MARRIAGES
CONTRACTED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

"Within the limits of her political power [South Carolina] may...
enforce her own policy regarding the marriage relation-an institution more
basic in our civilization than any other."' South Carolina's power to refuse
recognition of marriages is, however, constitutionally limited by the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.'

A. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
If there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from their
lawmakers, it is rules of law that will enable individuals to tell whether
they are married and, if so, to whom. 66

1. Application of the Clause to Marriage
Putting aside for the moment objections founded on public policy, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause would appear to compel all other states and United
States territories to recognize same-sex marriages legally contracted in Hawaii
(which assumes that state will ultimately legalize such unions). The United
States Supreme Court, however, has never ruled on the issue of whether
marriages must be accorded full faith and credit: that is, whether a marriage
contract is an "public Actfl, Record[] or judicial Proceeding[]." 67 Evan Wolfson68 has argued that marriages should be afforded full faith and credit. 69
First, he asserts that the creation of a civil marriage is a "public Act" because
it is performed pursuant to a statutory scheme and usually by a publicly

64. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942).

65. U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1.
66. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
67. The Clause provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738-1739 (1994)
(enforcing the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
A number of lower federal courts and states have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Thomas
v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that although New York does not
recognize common-law marriages, it gives full faith and credit to those marriages validly
contracted under the laws of other states); Orsbum v. Graves, 210 S.W.2d 496 (Ark. 1948)
(holding that Arkansas must give full faith and credit to a validly contracted Texas common-law
marriage).
68. Co-counsel in Baehr and Senior Staff Attorney of the Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc.
69. See Evan Wolfson, Winning and Keeping Equal MarriageRights: What Will Follow
Victory in Baehr v. Lewin?, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (Nov. 7, 1994).
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designated official. Furthermore, the marriage itself is "an act-a res, a thing
or status itself created by [the] State. "70 Second, Wolfson points out that the
marriage certificate may be considered a "Record" of the res, recording
that the marriage was validly contracted and that the contracting parties were
statutorily competent7 to enter into the contract.' Finally, Wolfson argues
that "celebrating a marriage is arguably a 'judicial Proceeding' in at least those
sixteen states in which judges, court clerks, or justices of the peace officiate. " 3 Wolfson's arguments were sufficiently persuasive to prod a number
of state legislatures and ultimately Congress into action. 74
2. The "PublicPolicy" Exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause
The statute refusing to recognize same-sex marriages in South Carolina
does not explicitly declare that South Carolina will refuse to recognize samesex marriages legally performed in other states.75 Instead, South Carolina law
mandates such marriages are "void ab initio76 and against the public policy
of this State." 77
The United States Supreme Court has generally recognized a public policy
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In Pink v. A.A.A. Highway
Express,7 8 the Court noted that "the full faith and credit clause is not an
. [Thus,] consistent with the
inexorable and unqualified command ...
appropriate application of the [clause], there are limits to the extent to which
the laws and policy of one state may be subordinated to those of another."" 9
More specifically, the Court opined in Nevada v. Hall' that "the Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not require a State to apply another State's law in

70. Id. at 4.
71. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
72. Wolfson supra note 69, at 4.
73. Id.
74. When considering H.R. 3396, see supra note 20, the House Committee on the Judiciary
reported that Wolfson's Full Faith and Credit strategy was "plausible." H.R. REP. No. 104-664,
at 6 (1996), available in 1996 WL 391835.
75. 1995 S.C. H.B. 4502 included language that "marriages between persons ofthe same sex
valid in another state are void in this State." A Senate bill included similar language. See 1995
S.C. S.B. 1151. The bill signed into law by the Governor did not include such direct language
regarding South Carolina's intent not to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states.
76. "From the beginning; from the first act.. . ." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 6 (6th ed.
1990).
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
78. 314 U.S. 201 (1941).
79. Id. at 210.
80. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
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violation of its own legitimate public policy."81 According to these precedents, South Carolina would have to demonstrate merely that recognition of
a same-sex marriage validly contracted in another state violates the public
policy of this State-a fairly simple task in light of current statutory language.
The rather recently enacted Defense of Marriage Acts simplifies the task
even further.
In fact, passage of the Defense of Marriage Act made arguments
regarding the Full Faith and Credit Clause nugatory. 3 In one stroke of the
pen, President Clinton removed the Constitutional stumbling block (meager as
it was) of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. States may now refuse to
recognize gay marriages validly contracted elsewhere without running afoul of
a constitutional provision that the United States Supreme Court once noted had
"altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties,
each free to ignore rights and obligations created under the laws or established

81. Id. at 422; see also Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493, 502 (1939) (noting that there are limits upon the extent "to which a state may be required
by the full faith and credit clause to enforce even the judgment of another state in contravention
of its own statutes or policy").
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 1997). The Defense of Marriage Act provides in pertinent
part that:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
Id. The act also defines "marriage" as "the legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife" and "spouse" to refer "only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband
or a wife." Id. Discussion of the impact of this section of the Act is beyond the scope of this
note. However, it should be noted that the federal government will not recognize same-sex
marriages even if the state in which the couple resides does recognize their union. This will, in
effect, mean that gay marriages will be second class marriages. A second class marriage for a
second class citizen?
83. The Act has two purposes. First, Congress was trying to defend the institution of
traditional heterosexual marriage. Second, Congress intended "to protect the right of the States
to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition of same-sex unions, free from
any federal constitutional implications that might attend the recognition by one State of the right
for homosexual couples to acquire marriage licenses." H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996).
availablein 1996 WL 39,1835. States' rights advocates who argue that this federal legislation is
a step forward in the march toward greater state, and lesser federal, control need to re-examine
their thinking. It confounds logic to argue that states may increase their sovereignty by the
legislative grace of the U.S. Congress. As the dissenting view in the House Report noted, "The
clear expression in this legislation that the Congress has a role in determining when a state may
not offer full faith and credit creates a standard of Federal control antithetical to conservative
philosophy and the Tenth Amendment: That powers not enumerated for the Federal Government
are reserved to the States." Id. at 40.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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by the judicial proceedings of the others. "I' No more. The "gay exception"
to the Full Faith and Credit Clause effectively returns states to a preconstitutional status. As for how they choose to legally regard homosexual
unions, the states are again islands of their own decisional postures. They are,
in this limited context, free to completely ignore their sister sovereigns.

Congress has constitutional authority to pass such a piece of legislation,
aimed to deny rights to one particular group, based upon Article IV, section
one of the United States Constitution, which provides that "Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." 5 As a result of the
Defense of Marriage Act, South Carolina may enforce its statute without ever
encountering a conflict regarding the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Cross
border treatment of marriage is subject only to a common law conflict of laws

analysis.
B. Conflict of Laws Analysis
South Carolina follows the "general rule [that] 'the validity of a marriage
is determined by the law of the place where it is contracted,' . . . and will be
recognized in another state unless 'such recognition would be contrary to a
strong public policy of that State.'" 6 South Carolina's public policy may be
found "in the state's constitution, statutes and decisional law."' The

84. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,439 (1943),partialyoverruledonother
grounds by Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
85. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The House Report on the Defense of Marriage Act found
that "while States are generally obligated to treat laws of other States as they would their ownCongress retains a discretionary power to carve out such exceptions as it deems appropriate."
H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 25 (1996), available in 1996 WL 391835. Professor Laurence Tribe
of Harvard University Law School, disagrees that Congress possesses the ability to pass such a
piece of legislation under the "Effects Clause." In a letter to Senator Edward M. Kennedy,
subsequently entered into the Congressional Record, Professor Tribe argues that "congressional
power to 'prescribe ... [the] effect' of sister-state acts, records, and proceedings ... includes
no congressional power to prescribe that some acts, records, and proceedings that would
otherwise be entitled to full faith and credit ... shall instead be entitled to no faith or credit
at all!" 142 CONG. REc. S5931-33 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
Professor Tribe also suggested that the Act may violate the equal protection component of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), "on
the ground that it singles out same-sex relationships for unfavorable legal treatment for no
discernable reason beyond public animosity to homosexuals." Id. at S5932.
86. Zwerling v. Zwerling, 270 S.C. 685, 686, 244 S.E.2d 311,312 (1978) (quoting 52 Am.
JuR. 2D Marriage§§ 80, 82 (1970)) (emphasis added); see also Everly v. Baumil, 209 S.C. 287,
290, 39 S.E.2d 905, 906 (1946) ("It is fundamental that each state has the right to determine the
marital status of its citizens under its laws.").
87. Newberry v. Georgia Dep't of Indus. &Trade, 283 S.C. 312, 316, 322 S.E.2d 212, 214
(Ct. App. 1984).
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dissenting view in the House Report on the Defense of Marriage Act noted
that "[s]tates could show their public policy exception to same-sex marriage
by offering
gender specific marriage laws, anti-sodomy statutes, common law,
88
etc."
South Carolina's public policy is to "foster and protect the marriage
relationship. "89 Indeed, "no State in the Union has been more ardent, as a
matter of public policy, in protecting marriage as an institution; together with
all of the reciprocal rights and duties of both husband and wife, than has the
State of South Carolina."' Just as South Carolina's statutes and common law
indicate a public policy favoring the traditional institution of marriage, the law
appears to indicate a concomitant policy of disfavoring recognition of same-sex
unions. Even before the statutory ban was enacted, the Attorney General felt
sufficiently confident to proclaim to the Honorable Terry E. Haskins
that "South Carolina law does not recognize marriages between members of
the same sex ... [because] such marriages performed in this State are void,
against public policy and contrary to centuries of common law teachings and
traditions. "91
Moreover, South Carolina could assert that validating a same-sex
marriage contracted in another state would violate the natural and positive law
of this State. An appellate court in New Mexico recently took such an
approach and expressed the public policy test to be "whether the marriage is
considered odious by the common consent of nations or whether such
marriages are against the laws of nature."' However, because Denmark,
Sweden, and Norway now recognize same-sex marriages,' it may be more
difficult to argue that gay marriages are odious by the common consent of
nations. Blackstone certainly considered homosexual sodomy, an implicit byproduct of same-sex marriage, to be against the laws of nature. Indeed, he
wrote that sodomy was an act "the very mention of which is a disgrace to
human nature. "I It is noteworthy that South Carolina, like many other states,
once prohibited interracialmarriages because such unions were believed to

88. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 38 (1996), available in 1996 WL 391835.
89. Watson v. Watson, _ S.C. _, _, 460 S.E.2d 394, 395 (1995); see also Russo v.
Sutton, 310 S.C. 200, 204, 422 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1992) (noting that the public policy of South
Carolina is "to foster and protect marriage").
90. Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 531, 126 S.E.2d 570, 578 (1962) (Bussey, J.,
dissenting).
91. Letter from Charles M. Condon, Attorney General, to Honorable Terry E. Haskins,
Speaker Pro Tempore 4 (April 11, 1996).
92. Leszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d 1049, 1055 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
93. See Wetzstein, supra note 20, at A3.
94. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting
4 WiLLIAM BLAcKSToNE, COMMENTARIEs *215).
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violate natural law.91 Thus, what is "natural" and "unnatural" appears to be
subject to change. At present, however, South Carolina's positive law does not
bode well for recognition of same-sex marriages contracted in another state.
V. CONCLUSION

South Carolina will not likely be the principal battleground in any gay
rights litigation. Yet, the question still exists, how formidable an obstacle is
the State's statutory prohibition on same-sex marriage? Perhaps the most
exploitable weakness in the statute's legality is the interaction between the
equal protection arguments and the conflict of laws arguments. South Carolina
may well find itself in a "catch-22" because the more animus toward homosexuals the state heaps upon the scale to demonstrate that same-sex marriage
recognition would violate the State's public policy, the lighter the equal
protection scale becomes. Ultimately, South Carolina may be less capable of
successfully defeating an equal protection challenge as its public policy
arguments undercut any claims that the statute was passed for legitimate
purposes. The State would have to rob Peter to pay Paul in order to prevent
Peter from marrying Paul.
It seems likely that Hawaii, and perhaps other states, will eventually
recognize same-sex unions. It also seems likely that the Defense of Marriage
Act will withstand constitutional attack. Therefore, the United States will
become a patchwork, with a few states recognizing same-sex marriages but
most finding such unions violative of their strong public policies. Will the few
states that allow for recognition become havens for gay couples who wish to
live their lives under an umbrella of relative legal certainty the likes of which
heterosexuals take for granted? A married gay couple traveling on this
country's interstate roadways would, without much fiction, present its
marriage license at each border crossing. And the legend would read, "void
where prohibited by law."
Rodney Patton

95. See Kinny v. Virginia, 71 Va. (30 Grat) 284, 287 (1878) (describing interracial
marriages as "connections and alliances so unnatural that God and nature seem to forbid them");
see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (noting that Virginia courts had attempted to
justify anti-miscegenation statutes on the basis that such unions were contrary to natural law).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss3/9
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